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Abstract 
In economics, the recruitment process of firms is largely treated as a black box. To shed light 
on this process, we use new representative linked employer-employee data for German 
private-sector establishments to explore search, selection and screening activities over the 
years 2012-2018. We document longitudinal changes in hiring policies and address the 
heterogeneity across establishments relating to size, ownership, sector, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Firms’ recruitment strategies have sizeable effects on the composition of 
worker productivity, worker-firm match quality, the number of open vacancies, as well as 
expected staffing problems. Finally, we outline potential mechanisms and research gaps for 
future work, where there is room for more detailed and causal evidence.  
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1 Introduction 
The hiring and recruitment process, with its ultimate goal of identifying the best matches of 
workers to firms, has long been one of the main challenges for companies (Alonso, 2018). 
Understanding this process is crucial, since a firm’s hiring costs can be significant when 
filling a vacancy: Muehlemann and Strupler Leiser (2018) show that, in Switzerland, the 
average hiring costs amount to about 16 weeks of wage payments, with the major part being 
post-match hiring costs. As Oyer and Schaefer (2011, p. 1784) argue, although the 
fundamental economic problems in hiring, namely costly search and asymmetric information, 
are well understood, “the methods that firms use to solve hiring problems still need a lot more 
research”. This is particularly true for the last two decades, as many areas of the labour 
market have undergone significant changes due to innovation in information technology. A 
recent development, which we also document in our employer survey, has been the rise of the 
internet and social media as a means to find workers, who can, e.g. signal certain skills in 
online platforms. It could potentially matter where a worker is recruited from, e.g. from the 
internet, from a poaching agency, or through referrals. On the one hand, employer and 
employee search processes have become more complex through, for instance, the advent of 
information technology resulting in an increasing number of recruitment channels. On the 
other hand, recruiting suitable workers has potentially become easier through, for instance, 
the use of algorithms in personnel selection, giving firms more opportunity to create 
economic surplus through efficient worker-firm matching (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011). 
Complementary to the magnitude of studies on employees’ job search behaviour, i.e. the 
supply side, we want to take the perspective of the firm and shed light on the much less 
explored demand side. In detail, we want to focus on the prevalence of employer search and 
employee selection instruments and their determinants. Furthermore, we analyse the impact of 
recruitment practices1 on employee and match quality as well as on establishments’ 
assessments of future labour market problems such as problems to fill vacancies. Our 
measures for employee quality are employee fixed effects (based on the framework by Abowd 
et al. (1999) and Card et al. (2013)), while match quality is proxied by vacancy duration (time 
to fill a qualified position) and involuntary turnover during probationary periods. 
                                                 
1 In this study, we subsume all job search strategies, screening measures such as employment interviews and 
assessment centres, and turnover during the probationary period under the umbrella term recruitment practices. 
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Although some studies have identified positive effects of employee selection and pre-hire 
screening instruments on different outcome variables (Autor and Scarborough, 2008; Huang 
and Cappelli, 2010; Hoffman et al. 2018), we lack representative evidence on the variety of 
recruitment practices that firms use, and on their development over time (Alonso, 2018). This 
gap in the literature has also been advocated by Oyer and Schaefer (2011), who claim that 
previous papers “do not generally make careful distinctions between, say, hiring practice A 
and hiring practice B” and that research should invest more effort into “gathering information 
about firm-level differences in specific hiring strategies.” (p. 1816). The main reason for this 
gap in the literature has been the absence of panel data on detailed recruitment practices that 
is representative for firms of an entire economy.  
The labour economics literature has extensively studied the matching process with costly 
search and asymmetric information, i.e. the challenge to improve the quality of the worker-
firm match (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Rogerson et al., 2005; 
Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007). But the literature typically treats firms as homogeneous 
and as a black box (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011, p. 1771), and often does not document across-
firm variation in hiring strategies in detail. A different strand of the literature analyses how 
active labour market policy programs affect firms' hiring strategies as well as job seekers’ 
search incentives and match quality (e.g., Gaure et al., 2012; Blasco and Pertold-
Gebicka, 2013). Researchers have also analysed the impact of labour market regulation (such 
as minimum wage adjustments) on firms’ hiring behaviour and worker selection (for a recent 
paper, see Butschek, 2019). 
We complement this literature by taking the perspective of the firm, and by analysing 
heterogeneity in establishments’ actual hiring practices and outcomes related to these 
differences. We make use of the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), a representative linked-
employer-employee panel data set for German establishments spanning the years 2012 to 
2018. The employer survey covers private-sector establishments with at least 50 employees 
liable to social security contributions. Our data set includes a rich number of employer search, 
employee screening and selection as well as on-the-job-screening measures, the majority of 
which has been asked repeatedly in each survey wave. 
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Our study is divided into three main parts. In the first part, we provide a longitudinal 
description of changes in the use of recruitment instruments. We emphasize that this part is 
rather explorative. Our broad coverage of establishments’ recruitment activities and the use of 
the panel dimension of our data is complementary to the labour economics literature2 as other 
surveys such as the IAB Job Vacancy Survey cannot track establishments across several 
survey waves. Hence, we contribute to a more detailed understanding of a firm’s recruitment 
and employee selection process. In the second part of the study, we examine heterogeneity of 
recruitment practices across firms. The literature on management practices emphasizes that 
structural firm characteristics, such as ownership structure and competition play a large role in 
determining the use of management practices, which ultimately explain across-firm 
productivity (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). However, there is a lack of more detailed and 
representative evidence on recruitment practices of firms. In detail, we investigate how these 
strategies are determined by structural characteristics such as establishment size, industry, and 
ownership structure. Further complementing our main analysis of observables, we estimate 
how much variation in the data can be explained by unobservable time-constant heterogeneity 
across establishments. Thus, our findings support the validity of recent theoretical 
contributions to business cycle models of vacancies that allow for firm level heterogeneity 
(Kaas and Kircher, 2015). 
In the third part, we complement the macroeconomic literature on employer search and 
matching by analysing how firms assess worker quality. This is important as firms’ 
assessment of worker quality is fundamental to how they set the hiring standard. Do 
establishments succeed at filling vacancies not only through offering higher wages, but 
through searching for workers and screening workers in a different fashion (Kaas and 
Kircher, 2015)? Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2020) use rich data of the IAB Job Vacancy Survey, a 
representative survey of unmet labour demand in Germany, to assess the relation between 
hiring rates and wages, worker quality, and job search effort. They show that hiring standards 
account for the majority of variation in the vacancy yield (hires per vacancy), emphasizing 
their importance. We assess which role recruiting practices play in this context. For some 
recruitment strategies, within-establishment variation complements variation in the cross-
section, allowing us to assess if certain establishments and if so, which establishments 
                                                 
2 Other surveys investigating recruitment practices in firms include the “Workplace Employment Relations 
Study”, a panel study representative of British workplaces. As the most recent survey wave has already been 
conducted in 2011, we provide a more recent overview here. 
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become more successful in filling vacancies with well-suited employees. This translates into 
our third research question, whether and how different recruitment channels for hiring 
workers affect the quality of matches. 
Our results show that the use of many recruitment practices is quite persistent across 
establishments and over time. The largest aggregate change in recent years has been the 
advent of social networks such as LinkedIn and Xing to find workers. Their use has increased 
for our sample from 27% of establishments in 2012 to 54% in 2018. On the other hand, the 
use of personality and cognitive ability tests has decreased in recent years. A topic which is 
receiving increasing attention in both the media and in academic literature is the use of 
artificial intelligence, algorithms, and machine learning techniques in the recruitment process 
(Horton, 2017; Hoffman et al, 2018; Erel at al., 2019). We document only a small number of 
establishments using algorithms to assess workers in 2018. Furthermore, there has been a 
slight decrease in involuntary turnover during probationary periods (due to being unsuited for 
the job).  
The cross-sectional heterogeneity of recruitment practices can largely be attributed to size: 
larger establishments use both more and more diverse recruitment strategies. We also find 
sectoral differences in the use of recruiting practices. For instance, the services sectors are 
more likely to use social networks than establishments in manufacturing. Further, ownership 
type also predicts the use of some screening measures. Importantly, family and founder firms 
are less likely to use interviews, while establishments owned by financial investors are more 
likely to use them.  
Focusing on employee and match quality, we find that poaching and employment interviews 
increase average worker productivity per establishment, even in establishment fixed effects 
regressions. In contrast, the use of short work samples decreases worker productivity, 
indicating that short work samples generally identify lower ability workers. Assessment 
centres and cognitive ability tests, on the other hand, do not seem to be correlated with ability. 
Finally, the use of personality or integrity tests is, on average, associated with a reduction in 
the share of workers who are dismissed within their probationary period. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter two reviews related literature, followed by chapter 
three that describes the data used in this study and the variables of interest. Chapter four 
presents descriptive results about the use of recruitment practices over time. Chapter five 
presents results of cross-sectional heterogeneity of recruitment practices, and chapter six 
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presents results on the effects of recruitment practices on related establishment-level 
outcomes. Chapter seven provides future research gaps and concludes. 
2 Related literature 
The impact of recruitment practices has been studied in the literature from different angles. 
One strand has focused on the role of sorting or self-selection of employees into firms and 
jobs. These mechanisms refer to a process where job offers are intentionally designed such 
that individuals with certain attributes are more likely to apply for the job than those lacking 
these attributes. A number of scholars adapted this framework to several questions related to 
recruitment processes. Autor (2001), among others, investigates the role of temporary help 
firms as a screening device, Cappelli (2004) and Manchester (2012) analyse the self-selection 
process in firms offering a tuition reimbursement program. Finally, Lazear (2000), among 
others, shows self-selection of employees into firms with variable pay schemes. 
Another strand has been tacked in the literature on employer search. The focus has been on 
the means employers use to collect information about potential hires (DeVaro, 2005). 
Rees (1966) established a distinction between formal (e.g. newspaper ads, poaching agencies) 
and informal recruitment methods (e.g. employee referrals) that employers use to collect this 
information. This distinction has, however, become somewhat complicated as establishments 
that advertise a job on a professional social network such as LinkedIn and receive a response 
can also utilize the network of the applicant, which might work very similar to a referral 
(Montgomery, 1991; Casella and Hanaki, 2008; Burks et al., 2015; Dustmann et al., 2016). 
Moreover, Hensvik and Nordström Skans (2016) provide empirical evidence that firms use 
the social ties of their productive employees (co-worker networks) to hire socially connected 
employees with high unobserved productivity. 
Another strand of the literature is emphasizing the role of information. Early contributions 
made a distinction between extensive and intensive information (Rees and Schultz, 1970). 
Extensive information refers to employers posting ads to gain information about more 
applicants, whereas intensive information provides more detail about specific applicants. 
Barron et al. (1985) further differentiate between extensive search (number of interviews per 
job offer) and intensive search (number of hours spent recruiting an applicant). In this regard, 
empirical work has, for instance, studied the nexus between search costs and the role of 
information in the search process, exploring how advanced knowledge of vacancies might 
impact search costs and the likelihood to fill the position (Barron et al. 1997; Burdett and 
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Cunningham, 1998). Theoretical work, on the other hand, has addressed, for instance, the role 
of dismissals during the probationary period as post-hire screening instrument (Bull and 
Tedeschi, 1989). 
In a stream of closely related studies, DeVaro and others use a cross-sectional survey of 
employers in four US metropolitan regions to assess the relation between recruitment 
strategies and vacancy duration. DeVaro (2005) finds that informal recruitment methods 
reduce the vacancy duration, whereas formal methods increase it. He also documents some 
heterogeneity in the use of practices according to size and industry. Using the same data, 
DeVaro and Fields (2005) do not find an effect of screening activities (such as number of 
applications, interviews, and reference checks) on worker performance. We aim to add to this 
stream of literature by exploiting the panel dimension of our data set, which allows to use, for 
instance, lagged dependent variable and fixed effects approaches. Further, we include recent 
recruitment strategies that have received little attention in representative analyses on hiring. 
Research in management and applied psychology is primarily focusing on employee 
screening, i.e. the process of selecting good matches out of a pool of job applicants. This 
research analyses post-hire outcomes such as turnover intention, commitment, and job-
satisfaction of employees hired through different screening policies (see Breaughe (2013) for 
a review). Most of the studies in this strand, such as Moser (2005) and Irving and 
Montes (2009) analyse the effects of individual attributes and candidates’ information about 
the job on turnover or employee attitudes. Furthermore, a huge literature in personnel 
psychology assesses the so-called criterion validity of specific selection procedures (Schmidt 
and Hunter, 1998; Van Iddekinge et al., 2012). A key insight from this literature is that more 
intensive screening increases the reliability of the assessment and, in turn, can increase the 
predictive validity of the recruitment procedure. 
In economics, there is a recent surge of interest in the impact of management practices, 
amongst them also recruiting and staffing measures. Large-scale survey studies have been 
conducted to investigate the connection between rather general management practices and 
firm performance. In a number of papers, Bloom and van Reenen (see 2010 for an overview) 
use telephone interviews to evaluate firms’ HR practices along different dimensions such as 
monitoring, target setting, and people management. Recruitment-wise, they aim to measure 
whether senior managers discuss attracting and developing talented people, and use a few 
open-ended questions to assess how well firms recruit, retain, and provide incentives to attract 
workers. Their work is complementary to ours, as we can cross-validate which recruitment 
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mechanisms should be seen as “best-practices” in a representative sample. We do not take for 
granted, e.g. that intensively searching for workers on professional networking websites is a 
“best-practice”, but rather test whether it leads to a better match quality. It is convenient for us 
that management practices do have a similar effect across countries (Bloom and van 
Reenen, 2007), so we do not necessarily see the conclusions from our findings being limited 
to Germany.3 
A recent study using data from the IAB Job Vacancy Survey by Rebien et al. (2017) finds that 
larger firms are relatively more likely to use formal than informal search activities, and also 
more likely to use formal search for high-skilled positions. Further, a firm’s formal search 
intensity is positively correlated with the number of applicants per vacancy. We also assess 
which channels and whether social networks and head-hunters used by the employer generate 
more applications per vacancy. Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2020) show that the firm’s hiring rate is 
negatively correlated with worker match quality, i.e. the hiring standard. As firms lower their 
hiring standard, they are able to employ workers at a faster rate. Further, hiring standards 
account for about 60% of the variation in the vacancy yield. This suggests raising hiring 
standards can increase match quality. We complement this research by studying the use of 
heterogeneous instruments to assess worker quality. 
3 Data  
3.1 Data sets 
In order to present an encompassing overview of hiring policies of German firms, we use 
multiple representative data sets, which can be linked to each other and to administrative data 
from the German social security records. The first data set we use is the Linked Personnel 
Panel (LPP), a recent, longitudinal linked employer-employee survey data set, which is 
representative for German establishments in the private sector with at least 50 employees 
(Kampkötter et al., 2016).4 The LPP links employee-level information (e.g., about attitudes, 
preferences and personality) with establishment-level information on management practices 
                                                 
3 Mainly in management research a related but somewhat older strand of research has studied the connection 
between the use of so-called high-performance work practices and employee or organisational outcomes such as 
workforce turnover and (labour) productivity (Huselid, 1995; Way, 2002). These studies typically only have a 
very limited focus on recruitment practices and face identification problems due to their mainly cross-sectional 
data sets. 
4 The LPP has been implemented by a research cooperation between the German Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) and the Universities of Cologne and Tübingen. 
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and structural firm characteristics. The LPP contains information on more than 7,000 
randomly drawn employees aged between 18 and 74 working in 700 to 1,200 establishments 
in four survey waves 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. The LPP employee survey is conducted via 
phone (CATI), whereas the employer survey is based on face-to-face interviews with 
establishment managers or HR executives. 
The employer survey is conducted subsequently to the regular IAB Establishment Panel 
(IAB EP) interview, an annual representative survey covering the universe of German 
establishments with at least one employee subject to social security (Ellguth et al., 2014). The 
IAB Establishment Panel has been conducted by the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB) since 1993 in West Germany and since 1996 in East Germany and currently comprises 
15,000-16,000 establishment interviews per year. We use the IAB EP since it provides 
detailed information on the demand side of the labour market – in particular, concerning the 
structure of the establishment’s workforce, fundamental establishment characteristics such as 
the type of management and establishment age as well as labour turnover, which can be 
linked to the LPP. 
Third, these data sets can further be matched to an additional administrative data source, the 
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB). The IEB cover all employees liable to social 
security contributions in Germany and contain individual employment spells with information 
about earnings, employers, job switching, and basic qualifications. They are available since 
1975 (1991) for West (East) Germany or, if later, since each individual’s entry into the labour 
market (vom Berge et al., 2013). Individual employment biographies are not only available 
for all surveyed employees in the LPP, but also for their non-surveyed co-workers in the 
establishments covered by both the LPP and the IAB EP employer survey. 
3.2 Measures 
Recruitment and selection instruments 
The LPP employer survey offers a range of items measuring an establishment’s recruitment 
behaviour and employee selection process. Table 10 in the Appendix provides a detailed 
overview of all survey items and their wording. We distinguish three recruitment phases: 
employer search (i.e. search for recruits by employers), pre-hire screening and employee 
selection, as well as on-the-job screening activities such as terminations during the 
probationary period.  
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Structural covariates 
One challenge of our analysis is the fact that a quasi-random use of recruitment policies by 
firms is rather unlikely to be observed. Our approach to address potential endogeneity 
problems will be the use of control variables on the establishment and individual level that are 
rather exogenous in nature, such as the type of ownership, an establishment’s age, its industry 
and region. These structural covariates should not be influenced by an establishment’s 
recruitment strategy.5 We only consider controls which are time-invariant, i.e. variables a firm 
decides for the long-run or before or independent from its decision on hiring strategies. We 
are confident that problems of reverse causality are less severe in this setup. In our regressions 
in Chapter 6, we also implement a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects approach to 
tackle potential endogeneity problems. 
We use a rich set of control variables based on merged information from our LPP employer 
survey with IAB Establishment Panel data. As a result, we are able to control for several 
structural variables including establishment size (50-99 employees (base); 100-249; 250-499; 
larger than or equal to 500 employees), region (north (base); south; east; west), city size 
(small village (base); mid-size town; metropolitan area), industry (manufacturing (base); 
metal, electrical and automotive industry; retail, logistics, and media; company-related and 
financial services; IT, communication and other services; healthcare and social services), 
ownership structure (family and founder firm (base); dispersed ownership; manager firm; 
financial investor, other types), type of management (exclusively owners or members of 
owner families (base); exclusively employed managers; both), independent establishment (vs. 
subsidiary), Chief Human Resource Officer in executive board (vs. below executive level), 
establishment age (0-5 years (base), 6-10, 11-20, greater than 20 years), works council (1 if 
present), establishment trains apprentices (1 if yes), collective agreement (no (base), sectoral-
wide collective agreement, firm-wide collective agreement). Furthermore, we control for time 
fixed effects. 
  
                                                 
5 One could argue that firm size is endogenous to the recruiting practices used. If a firm is better at hiring than 
competitors, then one can increase the firm size faster. We circumvent this problem by using four size brackets, 
so a firm’s size category is very unlikely to change in the short run in response to hiring strategies. 
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Establishment-level outcome variables 
To measure the impact of establishments’ hiring policies, we look at different establishment-
level outcomes, reflecting the explorative character of our study. From the LPP, we use the 
number of applications per open position and involuntary turnover during probationary period 
(as described above). From the IAB Establishment Panel, we use expectations of 
establishment managers regarding potential staffing problems. The item reads as follows: 
“Which personnel problems do you expect for your establishment within the next two years?” 
We use the following three response categories: high employee turnover, difficulties to recruit 
required skilled employees from the labour market, and staff shortages. Furthermore, we use 
the number of open vacancies for qualified positions in the first half of the fiscal year, which 
require vocational training, comparable professional experience or a university degree. 
Finally, we employ the total number of employees an establishment is trying to recruit 
immediately.  
As a proxy for individual productivity or ability of employees, we calculate time-invariant 
individual wage premia (which we call individual fixed effects) based on the framework by 
Abowd et al. (1999), and as applied to German establishments by Card et al. (2013). We 
employ the average of those estimated individual fixed effects for full-time employees per 
establishment (Bender et al., 2018) as an outcome variable that we interpret as the average 
productivity of an employer’s staff. Since the individual fixed effects are time-invariant by 
design, changes over time can only result from alterations in workforce composition. To 
tackle potential endogeneity concerns, we calculate individual fixed effects for the period 
2003 through 2010, i.e. prior to our estimation period. Summary statistics for all dependent 
and independent variables are shown in Table 11 in the appendix. 
4 The prevalence of recruitment and employee selection instruments 
This chapter gives a detailed, representative overview of the instruments German 
establishments use to recruit, screen, and select new employees. We categorize the different 
survey items with respect to three stages of a typical staffing process. These stages start with 
the opening of a vacant position and finish with the resulting employer-employee job match 
after the probationary period. The first part of this process is the recruitment process 
comprising activities such as recruiting and addressing candidates via online and social 
networks, as well as poaching activities via head-hunters or employment agencies (EA). After 
having received applications by potential candidates, firms start to screen and test their 
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applicants, which constitutes the second phase of the staffing process. Here, we are interested 
in the use of selection instruments, the importance of different selection criteria, and the 
heterogeneity in screening intensity, i.e. the total amount of time an establishment invests into 
testing and screening of applicants. The last step of the staffing process deals with on-the-job 
screening. Due to German dismissal legislation, we are particularly interested in employee 
turnover during the probationary period, i.e. within the first six months of an employment 
relationship. For this paper, we put a special focus on voluntary and involuntary quits during 
probation. 
For the following analyses, we use an unbalanced panel data set of all LPP establishments 
from 2012 to 2018. Furthermore, we calculate weighted averages to provide representative 
results (recall that our results are representative for German establishments with at least 50 
employees liable to social security in each wave of the survey). 
4.1 Employer search 
The job search strategies of firms encompass a wide range of traditional instruments, such as 
advertising in newspapers or using employee networks to recruit potential applicants. As 
young professionals increasingly use the World Wide Web and, especially, social media to 
communicate and search for jobs, we also expect firms to react to this trend.  
As shown in Figure 1, the use of social networks for recruitment purposes has risen sharply 
during the last decade. While only 27% of establishments used social networks in 2012, this 
proportion has doubled, such that more than half of the establishments (54%) use this tool in 
2018. We can also go into further detail on how employers use social networks as a 
recruitment tool. Conditional on using social networks for recruiting, Figure 6 in the 
Appendix shows that the vast majority of establishments uses social networks as a means to 
list vacancies (85% in 2018), followed by representation and advertising motives of the 
company (71% in 2018). Slightly more than half of the establishments in 2018 state that they 
use social networks for search, selection and direct approach of potential recruits.  
A more direct approach for the use of social media as a recruitment tool is the personal 
contact of workers already employed in other firms via social networks such as XING or 
LinkedIn. The share of firms having used this method has been fairly stable over time at just 
below or at 30 %, with the exception of 2016, where it has been at just below 40 %. Fairly 
stable over time has also been the use of head-hunters or employment agencies, with a slight 
increase in the two most recent waves, leading to a usage rate of 28% in 2018.  
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An advantage of our data is that we can separate our items addressing potential new hires via 
social networks and poaching using an agency or a head-hunter into managerial and non-
managerial employees. Further analyses show that slightly more establishments among those 
employing this strategy use it for head-hunting managerial employees rather than for non-
managerial employees (65-73% versus 52-59%). Also, roughly 25% of establishments 
between 2012 and 2016 and 32% of establishments in 2018 use head-hunters and employment 
agencies for both types of employees (multiple answers were possible). So while the use of 
social networks in general has sharply risen over time as a (new) hiring tool, other new forms 
of job search strategies remain stable.  
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
4.2 Employee selection 
We now turn to the second phase of a typical staffing process, namely the employee selection 
process. The incidence of possible instruments used to screen workers in the selection process 
is laid out in Figure 2, while the intensity of the selection process is laid out in Figure 3.6 
From Figure 2 we can see that almost all establishments use job interviews to screen workers 
ex-ante. The share ranges between 85% in 2014 and 87% in 2018, and is rather constant 
across time. On the contrary, only a minority of establishments uses assessment centres, 
cognitive ability (general mental ability (GMA)) tests, or personality tests during their 
employee selection process. The share of establishments using assessment centres is again 
rather constant over time, whereas for cognitive and personality tests, we see a sharp decline. 
The usage rate of GMA tests almost halves (decrease of 9 percentage points) from 2014 to 
2018. This is surprising given the fact that “GMA can be considered the primary personnel 
measure for hiring decisions” (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998, p. 266), as it shows the highest 
validity (correlations between test scores and desired job outcomes) and lowest application 
cost. The share of personality and integrity tests shows a decrease of about 70% (decrease of 
8 percentage points), which is again not in line with academic research showing that 
personality and integrity tests show high validities (Ones et al., 2007). One explanation for the 
decreasing trend in establishments might be the problem of transferring academic results into 
practitioner-oriented sources of information or a reluctance of applicants against these tests 
(Rynes et al., 2007; Alonso, 2018). 
                                                 
6 Note that information on selection instruments is available since wave 2014. 
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The importance of short work samples is rather constant over time, ranging from 52% in 2014 
to 57% in 2018. Concerning the use of new technologies, the LPP employer questionnaire 
2018 asks for the first time about the use of algorithms for determining suitable candidates 
during the recruitment process. We observe that only about 2% of establishments make use of 
this new technology. 
*** Insert Figure 2 about here *** 
Looking at screening intensity in Figure 3, our results reveal differences in the time used to 
screen managers and non-managerial employees. While for non-managers between 2.6 and 
3.2 hours of screening are allocated on average, this amount is much higher for managerial 
employees (between 4.5 and 5.4 hours). The graph also shows that there is no clear time trend 
observable.  
*** Insert Figure 3 about here *** 
4.3 On-the-job screening 
The final stage in firms’ hiring policies is on-the-job screening, which some firms might use 
to assess employees’ skills, effort, and output while working. The German Protection Against 
Dismissal Act (KSchG) allows on-the-job screening for a so-called probationary period of six 
months. During these six months working contracts can be terminated relatively easy. In 
contrast, after this period, terminations become much more difficult, if even almost 
impossible. This kind of employer learning may act as a substitute for pre-hire screening 
activities, which will be assessed in Chapter 6 of the study. 
Figure 4 shows the share of individuals who left the establishment during the probationary 
period, either voluntarily (left panel) or involuntarily (right panel). We observe that voluntary 
quits as well as involuntary quits are less frequently used in recent years, ranging at 4.5% and 
7.4% at the end of 2018, respectively. A feature of our data is that from survey wave 2016 
onwards, we can further distinguish between the following four reasons for involuntary quits 
during the probationary period: not suited for job (professional and/or personal reasons), new 
workers not needed due to changing economic conditions, gross misconduct of employee 
(extraordinary termination), and other reasons (e.g., severe illness).7 Figure 7 in the Appendix 
shows that the vast majority of involuntary quits during probationary periods are caused by an 
employee-job mismatch (around 80), whereas severe misbehaviour plays a minor, but 
                                                 
7 Note that the relative proportions sum up to 100%. 
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growing role (12% in 2016 and 14% in 2018). Thus, we can assume unsuitability to be the 
driving force behind involuntary quits during probationary periods in the remainder of the 
paper. This validates the use of involuntary turnover during probation as a proxy for match 
quality.  
*** Insert Figure 4 about here *** 
4.4 Importance of personal characteristics 
Apart from different hiring strategies, establishments can have certain attitudes towards hiring 
employees, which are characterised in the following. We measure the importance of the 
following individual characteristics for the hiring process: professional competence, personal 
competence, ethical standards and cognitive ability. The items were asked in 2016 and 2018 
and are measured on a five-point Likert scale from 1 “not important at all” to 5 “very 
important”. Figure 5 shows a similar, slight downward trend in the importance of all hiring 
criteria. Professional and personal competence are the most important criteria for recruitment 
decisions (4.4 and 4.1 in 2018), followed by cognitive ability. Ethical standards are of lowest 
importance (3.6 in 2018). This is actually in line with the results in Figure 2, which shows a 
declining use of cognitive ability and personality tests. This result might be a bit surprising as 
cognitive ability but also different facets of personality can be tested nowadays by means of 
rather cheap and standardized test instruments (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998).  
*** Insert Figure 5 about here *** 
5 Hiring behaviour and establishment characteristics 
The descriptive analyses above suggest that not all employers use the same or the same 
amount of hiring methods, i.e. there is heterogeneity across establishments. In the following, 
we show in more detail which establishment characteristics determine the use of specific 
hiring policies. As dependent variables, we use each of the staffing and recruitment 
instruments described in Chapter 4. To investigate the extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity, 
we run multivariate, pooled logistic and OLS regressions. In case of logistic regressions, we 
report average marginal effects (AME) to interpret the coefficients in magnitude. Standard 
errors are clustered at the establishment level. The general specification explains the 
recruitment strategies as binary variables in a logistic regression (where F is a logistically 
distributed cdf), or as continuous variables using OLS (where F is a linear function), on the 
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structural covariates of interest, other structural covariates as controls, as well as time and 
region fixed effects,  
𝐹−1(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑓) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑓 + 𝜸𝑿𝒇 + 𝜃𝑟 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡. 
We use our rich set of independent variables, which has been presented in Chapter 3.2. The 
covariates cover a broad range of establishment-level characteristics usually applied in 
previous literature (e.g., DeVaro, 2005). In detail, we are interested in the sector, 
establishment size, and the ownership structure, as these have shown to have significant 
impact on search behaviour of firms (Rebien et al., 2017) and the take-up of management 
practices (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). We also control for management structure, region, 
time effects, size of city where the firm is located, whether the establishment is independent, 
whether the chief human resource officer is a member of the executive board, the 
establishment age, whether there is a works council, whether the establishment trains 
apprentices, and the membership to collective bargaining agreements.8 
5.1 Employer search 
The results in column 1 of Table 1 show that service sector establishments are significantly 
more likely to use social networks as a means to recruit employees than the manufacturing 
sector (reference category), holding observable factors constant. For instance, the company-
related services & financial services and IT & communication sector establishments are, on 
average, 23 and 26 percentage points (pp) more likely to use social networks. For the retail, 
logistics and media sector, we find a 9 pp higher likelihood. This constitutes an economically 
sizeable difference. However, this pattern does not apply to health and social sector 
establishments, where the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
Columns 2 and 3 reveal that sectoral differences in addressing and poaching employees of 
other companies using social networks are by far not as large. Only the company-related 
services & financial services sector is around 10 pp more likely to address potential recruits 
on social networks, compared to manufacturing establishments. For poaching activities via 
employment agencies or head-hunters, we observe almost no statistically significant industry 
differences.  
                                                 
8 An important further control variable is competition in the industry an establishment is operating in. We hand-
collected information on imports from the UN Comtrade database at the two-digit sector level, and merged this 
information to our data. Including these variables as a robustness check shows that all results remain 
qualitatively the same. 
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Table 1: Determinants of employer search instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Recruiting via social 
networks 
Address via social 
networks 
Poaching via EA or 
head-hunter 
Metal, electrical, automotive 0.0373 -0.0282 0.0395 
 (0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0248) 
Retail, logistics, media 0.0946*** 0.0321 -0.0520* 
 (0.0301) (0.0295) (0.0281) 
Company-related & financial services 0.2260*** 0.0959*** -0.0203 
 (0.0333) (0.0329) (0.0300) 
IT, communication, other services 0.2596*** 0.0466 0.0123 
 (0.0477) (0.0443) (0.0455) 
Healthcare & social services 0.0431 0.0047 0.0390 
 (0.0434) (0.0495) (0.0493) 
Est. size (100-249 empl.) 0.0862*** 0.0818*** 0.1037*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0217) 
Est. size (250-499 empl.) 0.1527*** 0.1078*** 0.1573*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0272) (0.0307) 
Est. size (>=500 empl.) 0.2705*** 0.1784*** 0.3460*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0351) (0.0386) 
Est. age (6 to 10 years) -0.0706 0.0512 -0.0387 
 (0.0568) (0.0567) (0.0534) 
Est. age (11 to 20 years) -0.1156** 0.0293 -0.0748 
 (0.0550) (0.0501) (0.0471) 
Est. age (>20 years) -0.1510*** 0.0294 -0.0756* 
 (0.0519) (0.0468) (0.0440) 
Manager firm -0.0377 0.0060 -0.0296 
 (0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0259) 
Financial investor -0.0017 0.1118*** 0.1602*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0378) (0.0390) 
Dispersed ownership 0.0931** 0.0672 0.0007 
 (0.0410) (0.0414) (0.0385) 
Other form of ownership -0.0838*** -0.0220 -0.0546** 
 (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0278) 
Observations 3,431 2,140 3,469 
Pseudo R-squared 0.128 0.167 0.093 
This table reports average marginal effects of a logistic regression using the unbalanced panel. Additional 
control variables include collective agreements (3 dummies), works council, apprenticeship training firm, CHRO 
in executive board, city size (3 dummies), type of management, independent establishment, year and region fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
For all employer search instruments, we observe a frequency of use that strongly increases in 
establishment size. Size effects are largest for the use of poaching agencies (35 pp more likely 
to be used by large establishments), followed by recruiting via social networks (27 pp), and 
lower for addressing workers directly online (18 pp). Controlling for establishment size, we 
find that establishment age is negatively correlated with the use of social networks as a 
recruitment tool. Furthermore, the ownership type is a good predictor of employer search 
activities. Establishments with dispersed ownership are 9 pp more likely to use social 
networks compared to family and founder firms. An interesting pattern can be observed for 
establishments owned by financial investors. These firms are 11 pp more likely to address 
employees via social networks, and even 16 pp more likely to poach employees using an 
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agency or a head-hunter compared to the reference group. This reveals that more direct and 
targeted recruitment behaviour can rather be found in establishments owned by capital 
investors. 
Differentiating between managerial and non-managerial employees, regression results 
(untabulated) show that the heterogeneity in establishment size (i.e. higher usage rates in 
larger establishments) is largely driven by managerial employees as a target group. Besides 
these results, we observe no distinctive patterns between managerial and non-managerial 
employees. Potentially, firms need a higher level of talent for higher positions, and aim to 
attract more workers to apply for managerial positions. Assignment models of managers to 
firms predict that managers with a larger degree of talent can run firms with a higher amount 
of capital and labour. In this setting, larger establishments have a higher return than smaller 
firms in finding more talented managers, if their talent is a factor of production, and thus aim 
to find more applicants (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). 
5.2 Employee selection 
In Table 2, we address the use of various pre-hire screening (employee selection) measures 
used at the hiring stage. Concerning the use of employment interviews, we observe no 
significant differences across industries, but the use of employment interviews is positively 
correlated with establishment size. Establishments with over 500 employees are 12 pp more 
likely to use them compared to the smallest establishments. Compared to the base category of 
family and founder firms, owner-managed establishments are 5 pp less likely to use 
interviews, and establishments with dispersed ownership are around 8 pp more likely to use 
interviews. 
The use of assessment centres (ACs) is more heterogeneous between industries. ACs are 
significantly more likely to be used in service-related sectors than in manufacturing. 
Establishment size is also positively correlated with the use of assessment centres, stronger 
than for employment interviews. Large establishments are, on average, 20 pp more likely to 
use them than smallest establishments. A potential explanation is that assessment centres have 
more setup costs, i.e. fixed costs, involved than cognitive ability and other standardized, less 
customized tests (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998). Thus, returns to using an AC may be greater for 
larger firms. We again find that establishments with dispersed ownership show a significantly 
higher usage rate compared to family and founder firms (around 7 pp). 
18 
There is almost no observable heterogeneity based on the structural covariates across 
establishments in the use of cognitive ability testing, as shown in column 3. One striking 
result is that establishments in the healthcare and social services sector are 12 pp less likely to 
use standardized GMA tests compared to manufacturing. Similarly, there are only few 
significant establishment characteristics that explain the use of personality and integrity tests. 
One exception is that the retail, logistics, and media sectors are 9 pp more likely to use these 
tests. One potential explanation is that these industries, particularly retailing and logistics, are 
characterized by high levels of customer interaction, for which certain personality types and 
ethical behaviour can be important. Additionally, there is a slight tendency that personality 
tests are rather used in larger establishments. 
Turning to the use of short work samples, the IT and communication sector as well as 
healthcare and social services are 15 pp and 25 pp more likely to ask for short work samples 
during recruitment, respectively. Taken together with the results in column 3, the health care 
and social services sector shows the following pattern: It is reasonable to expect that social 
skills are more important in those jobs than cognitive ability, which might explain why IQ 
tests are significantly less used in this sector, but the sector shows the highest coefficient in 
magnitude when it comes to short work samples. This indicates that health and social sector 
establishments try to assess their required social skills with the use of work samples.  
Concerning the use of algorithms for determining suitable candidates during recruitment, we 
see almost no statistically significant differences across establishments. One striking result is 
the missing coefficient for the healthcare and social services sector indicating that there is no 
single establishment in this sector which makes use of algorithms during the recruitment 
process. Overall, one has to note that due to the low number of observations that already use 
this recruitment technology, we most likely have a problem of statistical power.  
The results until now support the interpretation that establishment characteristics are 
correlated with different facets of hiring behaviour, but there is no homogeneous pattern for 
each of our considered employer search and selection instruments.  
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Table 2: Determinants of employee selection instruments 
 
(1) Employment 
interview 
(2) Assessment 
centre 
(3) Cognitive 
ability (GMA) 
(4) Personality or 
integrity test 
(5) Short work 
sample 
(6) Selection 
algorithms 
Metal, electrical, automotive 0.0176 0.0315* -0.0250 0.0024 0.0004 0.0126 
 (0.0199) (0.0181) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0322) (0.0177) 
Retail, logistics, media -0.0277 0.1160*** 0.0433 0.0856*** 0.0708* -0.0172 
 (0.0267) (0.0255) (0.0304) (0.0299) (0.0382) (0.0257) 
Company-related & financial 0.0319 0.1093*** -0.0186 -0.0000 -0.0166 0.0335 
services (0.0247) (0.0309) (0.0272) (0.0267) (0.0406) (0.0209) 
IT, communication, other services 0.0466 0.0885** 0.0211 0.0291 0.1531*** 0.0087 
 (0.0296) (0.0420) (0.0423) (0.0386) (0.0528) (0.0352) 
Healthcare & social services -0.0588 -0.0152 -0.1159*** -0.0238 0.2536***  
 (0.0414) (0.0286) (0.0238) (0.0347) (0.0467)  
Est. size (100-249 empl.) 0.0630*** 0.0406** 0.0036 -0.0365* -0.0011 0.0418* 
 (0.0201) (0.0175) (0.0206) (0.0189) (0.0284) (0.0217) 
Est. size (250-499 empl.) 0.0697*** 0.0923*** 0.0120 0.0325 -0.0143 0.0383* 
 (0.0260) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.0295) (0.0374) (0.0230) 
Est. size (>=500 empl.) 0.1197*** 0.2022*** 0.0230 0.0773* -0.0539 0.0402 
 (0.0237) (0.0394) (0.0363) (0.0425) (0.0469) (0.0258) 
Est. age (6 to 10 years) 0.0297 0.0997 0.0796 0.0621 -0.0273 -0.0275 
 (0.0478) (0.0659) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0873) (0.0447) 
Est. age (11 to 20 years) -0.0145 0.0149 0.0013 -0.0395 0.0154 -0.0383 
 (0.0472) (0.0547) (0.0574) (0.0573) (0.0799) (0.0412) 
Est. age (>20 years) 0.0024 0.0180 0.0015 -0.0243 -0.0092 -0.0420 
 (0.0444) (0.0508) (0.0539) (0.0546) (0.0758) (0.0380) 
Manager firm -0.0487** 0.0196 -0.0122 -0.0053 -0.0523 -0.0096 
 (0.0221) (0.0199) (0.0215) (0.0222) (0.0320) (0.0216) 
Financial investor 0.0260 0.0191 -0.0289 0.0417 0.0312 -0.0016 
 (0.0284) (0.0297) (0.0286) (0.0362) (0.0456) (0.0242) 
Dispersed ownership 0.0814*** 0.0721** 0.0361 -0.0147 -0.0874* -0.0307 
 (0.0279) (0.0303) (0.0387) (0.0343) (0.0474) (0.0380) 
Other form of ownership 0.0179 0.0351 -0.0120 -0.0041 -0.0675* 0.0149 
 (0.0225) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0275) (0.0389) (0.0180) 
Observations 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 699 
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.156 0.034 0.034 0.062 0.150 
This table reports average marginal effects of a logistic regression using the unbalanced panel. Additional control variables include collective agreements (3 dummies), works 
council, apprenticeship training firm, CHRO in executive board, city size (3 dummies), type of management, independent establishment, year and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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5.3 Importance of personal characteristics 
We now assess whether there is also cross-sectional heterogeneity in the importance of 
personal criteria for the hiring process. Here, we regress the importance of these recruitment 
criteria, which are measured on a five-point Likert scale, on our set of establishment 
characteristics using pooled OLS.9 Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the retail, logistics, and 
media sector as well as company-related and financial services sector put less weight on 
professional competencies than the manufacturing sector, whereas the health and social 
services sector put significantly higher weight on this competence. Furthermore, 
establishments with dispersed ownership put a significantly larger weight on professional 
competencies than family and founder firms.  
Turning to the importance of personal competencies for recruitment, results in column 2 show 
that mid-size establishments with 250-499 employees put a higher weight on personal 
competencies. Furthermore, there is a tendency that younger establishments put more weight 
on personal competencies. Interestingly, we only find two significant coefficients for ethical 
values. First, ethical standards are significantly more important for recruitment decisions in 
the healthcare and social services sector, which is intuitively in line with prosocial types being 
more likely to work in this area (Brock et al., 2016). The magnitude of the correlation (0.50 
scale points) is also very large, compared to our other results. Also, manager-owned 
establishments put more weight on ethical values compared to family and founder firms. 
Surprisingly, our last criterion, cognitive ability, shows no statistically significant 
heterogeneity among establishments based on observables. To conclude, we observe much 
less heterogeneity across establishments in the importance of recruitment criteria compared to 
the use of recruitment and selection instruments.  
                                                 
9 Here, we can only interpret the sign and not the magnitude of the correlation, as we cannot be sure that there is 
a linear effect. However, the results remain qualitatively similar if we use Poisson regressions or ordered logistic 
regression models. 
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Table 3: Determinants of recruitment criteria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Professional 
competence 
Personal 
competence 
Ethical 
standards 
Cognitive 
ability 
Metal, electrical, automotive 0.0905* -0.0245 0.0341 0.0650 
 (0.0544) (0.0578) (0.0700) (0.0520) 
Retail, logistics, media -0.1959*** -0.0121 0.0123 -0.0446 
 (0.0700) (0.0699) (0.0795) (0.0636) 
Company-related & financial services -0.1581** 0.0278 -0.0012 -0.1089 
 (0.0803) (0.0788) (0.0884) (0.0684) 
IT, communication, other services -0.0769 0.1744 0.0448 0.1210 
 (0.1200) (0.1087) (0.1112) (0.0970) 
Healthcare & social services 0.1741** 0.1284 0.4986*** 0.0029 
 (0.0828) (0.1037) (0.0978) (0.0928) 
Est. size (100-249 empl.) 0.0032 0.0564 -0.0111 -0.0252 
 (0.0546) (0.0536) (0.0615) (0.0479) 
Est. size (250-499 empl.) 0.0478 0.2095*** -0.0003 0.0159 
 (0.0663) (0.0657) (0.0853) (0.0647) 
Est. size (>=500 empl.) -0.0320 0.0910 0.1262 -0.0282 
 (0.0928) (0.0869) (0.0959) (0.0752) 
Est. age (6 to 10 years) -0.0318 -0.2779** -0.2424 -0.1736 
 (0.1634) (0.1392) (0.1761) (0.1549) 
Est. age (11 to 20 years) -0.0482 -0.1773 -0.0827 -0.0357 
 (0.1346) (0.1293) (0.1672) (0.1461) 
Est. age (>20 years) 0.0442 -0.2021 -0.1002 0.0519 
 (0.1265) (0.1231) (0.1572) (0.1394) 
Manager firm 0.0678 0.0240 0.1559** 0.0327 
 (0.0641) (0.0639) (0.0685) (0.0560) 
Financial investor 0.0230 -0.0142 0.0085 -0.0316 
 (0.0938) (0.0772) (0.1055) (0.0739) 
Dispersed ownership 0.2062** 0.0457 0.1267 0.0916 
 (0.0820) (0.0893) (0.1046) (0.0781) 
Other form of ownership -0.0091 0.0079 0.0678 0.0189 
 (0.0686) (0.0683) (0.0797) (0.0655) 
Observations 1,564 1,563 1,562 1,562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.026 0.037 0.013 
This table reports results of a pooled OLS regression of the importance of various recruitment criteria measured on 
a five-point Likert scale on our set of controls using the unbalanced panel. Additional control variables include 
collective agreements (3 dummies), works council, apprenticeship training firm, CHRO in executive board, city 
size (3 dummies), type of management, independent establishment, year and region fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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5.4 Pre-hire screening intensity 
Our final measure of pre-hire screening activities is screening intensity, measured as the 
logarithm of the average number of hours spent on testing a successful applicant during the 
employee selection process. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the corresponding OLS 
regression results, differentiated between managerial and non-managerial employees. We 
observe strong correlations of establishment size and the logarithm of screening intensity 
mainly for managerial employees. For this group, the largest establishments invest, on 
average, 31%10 more time into testing an applicant in the selection process than the smallest 
establishments, mid-size establishments (250-499 employees) spend about 20% more time. 
This result again seems intuitively in line with larger firms having more capacity to screen 
workers, and returns to managerial talent increasing in firm size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). 
Our previous results, which show that larger establishments are more likely to address and 
poach managerial employees (and not non-managerial ones), are also in line with this 
interpretation. 
Table 4 shows that the size effects are much weaker for job testing of non-managerial 
employees. Here, the size of the coefficient for the largest establishments amounts to 14% for 
screening intensity of non-managerial employees, whereas the coefficients for the other size 
dummies are statistically and economically not significant. Interestingly, establishments with 
dispersed ownership and financial investor ownership show higher screening intensity for 
both types of employees. 
  
                                                 
10 (𝑒0.2722 − 1) ⋅ 100 
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Table 4: Determinants of screening intensity and employee turnover during probation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. var.: Screening intensity Turnover during  
probationary period 
 Managerial 
employees 
Non-manag. 
employees 
Voluntary Involuntary 
Metal, electrical, automotive 
industry 
-0.0196 -0.0009 
-0.4242 -1.0787* 
 (0.0365) (0.0304) (0.5500) (0.6210) 
Retail, logistics, communication -0.0756 -0.0194 1.2859* 2.0386** 
 (0.0482) (0.0404) (0.7231) (0.9618) 
Company-related & financial 
services 
-0.1115** -0.0126 
3.7340*** 6.7131*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0436) (0.7963) (1.1208) 
IT, communication, other services -0.1218 0.0717 1.2278 1.4762 
 (0.0808) (0.0675) (1.1770) (1.5114) 
Healthcare and social services -0.0759 -0.0426 3.6425*** 2.5776 
 (0.0735) (0.0648) (1.3682) (0.1236) 
Est. size (100-249 empl.) 0.1450*** 0.0095 -0.4062 -0.3957 
 (0.0366) (0.0305) (0.6266) (0.7552) 
Est. size (250-499 empl.) 0.1822*** 0.0076 0.1705 0.0538 
 (0.0456) (0.0374) (0.7312) (0.9371) 
Est. size (>=500 empl.) 0.2722*** 0.1218*** 0.0854 -0.3081 
 (0.0487) (0.0437) (0.8826) (1.0842) 
Est. age (6 to 10 years) 0.0258 0.0560 -1.5444 -2.3519 
 (0.0896) (0.0720) (1.5178) (2.5767) 
Est. age (11 to 20 years) -0.0289 0.0070 -1.6079 -2.2451 
 (0.0843) (0.0643) (1.4225) (2.4412) 
Est. age (>20 years) 0.0088 0.0481 -2.0522 -5.1432** 
 (0.0781) (0.0613) (1.3506) (2.2885) 
Manager firm -0.0281 0.0094 -0.8742 -0.5267 
 (0.0420) (0.0352) (0.5741) (0.8817) 
Financial investor 0.1259** 0.1046** -0.1659 0.4493 
 (0.0533) (0.0477) (0.9968) (1.3282) 
Dispersed ownership 0.0977* 0.0859* -1.0448 -2.8857*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0505) (0.7369) (0.8078) 
Other form of ownership 0.0020 -0.0021 -1.3220** -2.3895*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0368) (0.6709) (0.8777) 
Observations 3,088 3,330 3,214 3,212 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.040 0.038 0.062 
This table reports results of a pooled OLS regression of the logarithm of the number of hours spent on testing a 
successful applicant during the employee selection process (columns 1 and 2) and turnover during probationary 
period (columns 3 and 4) on our set of controls using the unbalanced panel. Additional control variables include 
collective agreements (3 dummies), works council, apprenticeship training firm, CHRO in executive board, city 
size (3 dummies), type of management, independent establishment, year and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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5.5 On-the job screening  
Now we turn to the last phase of the recruitment process, which is on-the-job screening, and 
assess which observable establishment characteristics explain turnover during probationary 
periods. Here, we are able to distinguish between voluntary, i.e. employee-initiated, and 
involuntary turnover, and for the latter, also know more about the reasons. As can be seen in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, both types of turnover are more likely in the retail, logistics, and 
media sector as well as in company-related and financial services. These correlations are also 
of economically significant magnitude, ranging from 1.3 to 6.7 percentage points. Voluntary 
turnover is also significantly higher (3.6 pp) in healthcare and social services compared to 
manufacturing. We also find some evidence that older establishments and those with 
dispersed ownership make less use of involuntary turnover.  
5.6 The role of establishment fixed effects 
Finally, we analyse inter-establishment variation in our outcome variables in more detail. 
Similar to Haylock and Kampkötter (2019), column 2 of Table 12 in the Appendix shows 
incremental changes in the explanatory power of our estimation mode, measured via pseudo 
(adjusted) R-squared, when adding establishment fixed effects. To further illustrate the 
influence of establishment characteristics in explaining total variation, we quantify the 
relative importance of establishment fixed effects by dividing incremental pseudo (adj.) R-
squared from column 2 by total pseudo (adj.) R-squared. The results in column 4 show that 
the relative importance of establishment fixed effects is highest for recruitment criteria, 
screening intensity, and variations in turnover during probationary period. Here, 
establishment fixed effects explain a large proportion of total variation, even after controlling 
for industry, size, ownership, and other structural characteristics. However, time-constant 
establishment effects in explaining employment interviews and assessment centres or 
poaching behaviour via head-hunters or agencies are rather small. To conclude, we observe 
considerable heterogeneity between establishments in their use of recruitment strategies. 
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6 The performance of recruitment strategies 
In this chapter we investigate the relationship between an establishment’s use of recruitment 
strategies and its success in hiring the right employees. Apart from measuring the quality of 
the workforce and the matches, we focus on the ability to fill vacancies and the evaluation of 
the establishment’s own hiring policy.  
Our main hypotheses for the effects of firm’s recruitment strategies are the following. First, 
we hypothesize that, after weighing costs and benefits, a recruitment strategy generally leads 
to an increase in a firm’s hiring success. This is equivalent to saying filling a vacancy is 
beneficial for a firm, but that due to frictions it cannot reap the whole value of it. Hiring 
success is measured by worker quality, match quality, (an inverse measure of) vacancies and 
(the absence of) HRM problems associated with recruiting. Second, we hypothesize that 
formal employer search strategies, such as poaching, benefit establishments more than 
informal strategies, such as recruiting via social networks. Establishments potentially face a 
trade-off in a sense that informal strategies (formal strategies) may attract more (fewer) 
employees for a given position, but these employees might be less (better) suited to the job. 
Accordingly, formal strategies, such as poaching, have higher costs per applicant, making 
them potentially more cost-effective for high-skilled jobs. Third, we hypothesize that pre-hire 
screening intensity is associated with a decrease in turnover during the probationary period. 
We focus on the probationary period here, as firms potentially substitute pre-hire and post-
hire screening. 
We estimate cross-sectional and panel regressions using the different recruitment strategies, 
as well as structural establishment characteristics as independent variables. Our first 
specification is purely contemporaneous, i.e. we explain outcome variables in period 𝑡 using 
recruitment practices and control variables from the same period. To address a potential 
reverse causality problem, we switch to dependent variables in period 𝑡 + 1 (lead dependent 
variable) in the second specification and follow it up using a lagged dependent variable 
approach in the third specification. Finally, the fourth specification is a panel regression with 
establishment fixed effects controlling for time-constant heterogeneity such as the skill 
composition of the workforce. However, we caution that this approach requires within-
variation to identify an effect, i.e. variation of certain hiring strategies over time, which is not 
always present (see Chapter 4 and Table 13 in the Appendix, which decomposes variation 
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into between and within components).11 Standard errors are clustered at the establishment 
level. 
6.1 Employee quality 
We first test which recruitment strategies affect the average worker ability in an LPP 
establishment, as proxied by the standardised average employee fixed effect 𝑝 per 
establishment. Importantly, we measure productivity for each employee 𝑖 in the establishment 
𝑓 at time 𝑡 in the time frame 2003 to 2010 from their Individual Employment Biography data. 
This ensures that the worker-level productivity is predefined and thus exogenous to the 
establishment hiring the worker. Since worker productivity is fixed, if the outcome variable 
changes, this must be due to new hires entering and/or incumbent workers leaving the 
establishment in fixed effects specifications. Specifically, we regress 
1
𝑁
∑𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝐸𝐵,2003−2010 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1−3𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽4−9𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝛾𝑋𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡, 
in the baseline OLS specification, where our explanatory variables are divided into search and 
selection instruments as well as screening intensity. Depending on the specification, a 
different model is used. We also include all controls in our vector 𝑿 of covariates, which 
includes time dummies. 
Results in Table 5 reveal a relatively coherent picture for three recruitment practices across 
our set of specifications. First, poaching via EAs or head-hunters, on average, increases the 
composition of average worker ability in the establishment. This relationship is also of 
economic significance, showing a 5% of a SD increase in the composition of employee 
productivity in the fixed effects specification. One potential explanation of the use and 
success of poaching agencies is that they have better access to workers in other firms. 
Poaching agencies can sell knowledge of which employees may suit other employers to hiring 
firms, making them a valuable labour market intermediary.  
Positive coefficients can also be found for employment interviews; its use is associated with a 
3% of a SD increase in the composition of worker productivity in fixed effects specifications. 
Time-variation in the use of employment interviews is rather small, suggesting this is a lower 
bound. Nevertheless, the relatively large coefficient of almost 20% of a standard deviation for 
                                                 
11 Furthermore, using survey data in fixed effects estimations may likely cause an attenuation bias due to 
measurement error in the independent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
27 
the baseline OLS specification suggests that employment interviews indeed work well on 
average, which is in line with the findings of Schmidt and Hunter (1998).  
Third, the use of short work samples decreases average worker ability, indicating that short 
work samples generally identify lower ability workers. The size of the coefficient ranges from 
3.6% (LDV) to 15% (OLS) of a SD decrease. Since work samples are typically rather short, 
they do not reflect the worker’s long-run performance. A worker may put in a substantially 
larger amount of effort into a short work sample, only to later slack-off on the job, reducing 
the effectivity of this hiring practice. This runs contrary to predictions from personnel 
psychology literature showing that work samples have very high predictive validity (Schmidt 
and Hunter, 1998). However, we caution that our measure of individual ability might suffer 
from measurement error and, hence, attenuation bias.  
Table 5: Recruitment practices and employee quality  
Dep. var.: 
Average individual fixed effects (pre-period) per 
establishment and year (standardised) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Contemp. Lead DV LDV FE 
Recruiting via social networks 0.0334 0.0329 0.0074 0.0178 
 (0.0565) (0.0960) (0.0181) (0.0160) 
Address via social networks 0.1701* 0.0433 0.0109 -0.0223 
 (0.0910) (0.1483) (0.0336) (0.0237) 
Poaching via EA or head-hunter 0.1181** 0.1917** 0.0071 0.0468** 
 (0.0498) (0.0913) (0.0134) (0.0226) 
Employment interview 0.2029*** 0.2042** 0.0110 0.0342* 
 (0.0645) (0.0982) (0.0178) (0.0208) 
Assessment centre 0.0154 0.0031 -0.0087 -0.0045 
 (0.0819) (0.1214) (0.0258) (0.0274) 
Cognitive ability test 0.0168 -0.0266 -0.0001 0.0117 
 (0.0675) (0.1150) (0.0237) (0.0168) 
Personality or integrity test 0.0207 0.1017 -0.0139 -0.0013 
 (0.0646) (0.0887) (0.0231) (0.0186) 
Short work sample -0.1472*** -0.1652** -0.0356** -0.0110 
 (0.0477) (0.0798) (0.0151) (0.0122) 
Others -0.0264 -0.0141 0.0040 -0.0026 
 (0.0572) (0.1011) (0.0171) (0.0153) 
Average pre-hire screening intensity 0.0056 0.0064 0.0010 -0.0001 
 (0.0059) (0.0100) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Observations 1,446 478 1,169 1,446 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.402 0.378 0.940 0.041 
Additional control variables: log establishment size, collective agreements (3 dummies), works 
council, apprenticeship training firm, establishment age, ownership type, CHRO in executive board, 
type of management, independent establishment, industry, year and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Assessment centres and cognitive ability tests are not significant determinants of the 
composition of worker-level productivity. Assessment centres may select workers more on 
grit or endurance required to go through a long recruitment process, and less on ability, which 
may still be beneficial (Duckworth and Seligman, 2005, Borghans et al., 2008, Almlund et 
al., 2011).  
6.2 Match quality 
We next test which recruitment strategies affect the percentage share of involuntary turnover 
during the probationary period in establishment 𝑓 in time 𝑡 to measure the firm’s ability to fill 
a position with a well-suited worker. Specifically, we estimate an analogous regression to the 
above specification. Results in Table 6 show that the use of personality or integrity tests is, on 
average, associated with a 1.6-2.1 pp reduction (columns 1-3) in the share of workers being 
fired within their probationary period. The size of this correlation is quite large, as we observe 
7.4-8.7% of workers leaving firms involuntarily on average, depending on the survey wave. 
The magnitude and sign of the coefficient in the fixed effects regression is consistent with 
these findings, but we do not find a significant effect there, presumably due to low within-
variation.  
Short work samples tend to be associated with an increase of involuntary turnover by about 
1.5 pp to 1.8 pp, consistently estimated across our cross-sectional specifications. This result 
reflects that short work samples may sort lower ability workers into the firm, who may be 
sorted out during the probationary period, which might act here as an employer-learning 
device. Again, once we account for unobserved heterogeneity across establishments, the 
coefficient approaches zero and estimates become noisy.  
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Table 6: Recruitment practices and match quality 
Dep. var.: Involuntary turnover during probationary period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Contemp. Lead DV LDV FE 
Recruiting via social networks -0.2213 0.3297 -0.7394 -0.5051 
 (0.8077) (1.1609) (0.8504) (1.4008) 
Address via social networks 0.2450 -0.8967 1.1583 -0.0137 
 (1.0947) (1.6327) (1.2775) (1.8286) 
Poaching via EA or head-hunter 0.7606 -1.2047 0.8514 3.5497** 
 (0.7618) (1.1332) (0.8532) (1.7288) 
Selection interview -0.4291 -1.5048 -0.5667 -0.1169 
 (1.1311) (1.7734) (1.2904) (2.2568) 
Assessment centre 0.0680 0.0367 -0.6940 -1.0643 
 (1.0566) (1.3272) (1.0278) (1.6294) 
Cognitive ability test -0.6359 -0.4579 -1.0562 -0.1947 
 (0.8587) (1.1702) (0.9427) (1.4717) 
Personality or integrity test -1.5795* -1.8502* -2.1076** -1.0218 
 (0.8712) (1.0056) (0.9951) (1.7656) 
Short work sample 1.5767** 1.7577* 1.4665** 0.1592 
 (0.6767) (0.9730) (0.7278) (1.3147) 
Others 0.2657 1.0241 0.3579 0.3465 
 (1.0151) (1.4860) (1.1962) (2.1303) 
Average pre-hire intensity 0.0152 0.0112 0.1511 0.1124 
 (0.0931) (0.1285) (0.1130) (0.1944) 
Observations 2,068 897 1,475 2,068 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068 0.082 0.083 0.014 
Additional control variables: log establishment size, collective agreements (3 dummies), works 
council, apprenticeship training firm, establishment age, ownership type, CHRO in executive 
board, type of management, independent establishment, industry, year and region fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** 
p < .01. 
6.3 Vacancy duration 
In Table 7, we test whether recruitment strategies have an impact on the average time required 
to fill a position for qualified tasks (4 categories: less than 1 month, from 1 up to under 3 
months, from 3 up to under 6 months, 6 months or more). Note that we control for the average 
pre-hiring screening intensity per establishment here. Poaching instruments significantly 
increase the time needed to fill a position. This highlights a central trade-off made by 
establishments: using poaching firms to fill vacancies takes considerably longer to fill 
vacancies, although it, on average, leads to higher worker quality. This is in line with recent 
literature on directed search and firm’s hiring strategies (Wolthoff, 2018). Furthermore, use of 
social networks, interviews and assessment centres can be significant determinants of time to 
fill a position, but do not have a causal effect. Thus, firms aiming to fill vacancies with higher 
qualified workers must wait longer to fill the position. 
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Table 7: Recruitment practices and time to fill vacancies for qualified tasks 
Dep. var.: Average time required to fill vacancies for qualified tasks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Contemp. Lead DV LDV FE 
Recruiting via social networks 0.0793 0.0794 0.1051 0.0430 
 (0.0643) (0.1050) (0.0746) (0.0755) 
Address via social networks 0.1959** 0.1572 0.1614 0.1945* 
 (0.0854) (0.1478) (0.1042) (0.1005) 
Poaching via EA or head-hunter 0.1927*** 0.1684* 0.1321* 0.2523*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0924) (0.0734) (0.0726) 
Employment interview 0.1996* 0.2098 0.2009 0.1909 
 (0.1072) (0.1582) (0.1249) (0.1276) 
Assessment centre 0.1391* 0.2184* 0.0931 0.0876 
 (0.0777) (0.1196) (0.0927) (0.0931) 
Cognitive ability test -0.1104 -0.0867 -0.0343 -0.1013 
 (0.0724) (0.1110) (0.0916) (0.0927) 
Personality or integrity test -0.0108 0.2020* -0.0947 -0.0514 
 (0.0787) (0.1186) (0.0980) (0.0978) 
Short work sample -0.0219 -0.0673 -0.0106 -0.0070 
 (0.0561) (0.0874) (0.0656) (0.0658) 
Others 0.1859** 0.0945 0.1469 0.2190** 
 (0.0752) (0.1175) (0.0901) (0.0909) 
Average pre-hire intensity -0.0078 -0.0140 -0.0113 -0.0071 
 (0.0076) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
Observations 1,957 839 1,390 1,957 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.061 0.109  
This table reports results of an ordered probit regression (columns 1 to 3) and random-effects ordered 
probit regression (column 4). Additional control variables: log establishment size, collective 
agreements (3 dummies), works council, apprenticeship training firm, establishment age, ownership 
type, CHRO in executive board, type of management, independent establishment, industry, year and 
region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, 
** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
 
In Table 8, we test whether recruitment practices affect different vacancy measures, in detail 
the number of positions to fill for qualified tasks, vacancies to be filled as soon as possible, 
and the number of applicants per vacancy. The first two variables measure whether the firm 
has vacancy problems in general, and the last variable shows whether this advertising attracts 
more attention to the firm. Turning to vacancy problems, we find that in four out of eight 
specifications, the coefficient on using social networks is positive and significant. The results 
indicate that establishments, which recruit via social networks, have more vacant positions for 
qualified tasks in the subsequent period (columns 2) and more positions to fill immediately 
(column 8) in the fixed effects estimation. Hence, it seems not to be the case that 
establishments switch to using social networks in recruitment as a response to having many 
vacant and urgent positions to be filled. Together with our previous findings that recruiting 
via social networks is not significantly correlated with employee ability, match quality and 
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vacancy duration, this suggests that recruiting via social networks has not yet been fully 
worked for the establishments in our sample. Poaching, on the other hand, does not lead to 
higher vacancies in the future and also seems to lead to an increase in applications per 
vacancy (with the significance of estimates being more consistent across specifications). 
As a robustness check for the above interpretations using quantitative data, we test the impact 
of recruitment practices on human resource management problems expected during the next 
two years following a survey interview in Table 9. These outcome variables are indicators of 
high turnover, difficulties to find qualified personnel, and staff shortages, as expected by the 
establishment manager. These variables rate the overall success of the hiring strategy from the 
establishment’s own perspective complementary to the quantifiable measures used above. The 
results are estimated using probit regressions and panel probit regression (random effects 
probit), with analogous specifications to above regressions.  
Using social networks as a recruitment tool is more likely to lead to personnel problems 
across all outcome variables, with large and significant coefficients in the majority of 
specifications, which partly supports our previous results. This is a puzzling result, given that 
this instrument shows the highest increase in usage rates over time (see Figure 1). One 
interpretation is that using social networks is a “management fashion” and establishments are 
triggered by benchmarking surveys or imitating other firms in the market, but many of them 
are still learning how to effectively use the online job market to recruit the right employees. In 
line with the findings above, cognitive ability tests are positively correlated with expectations 
about hiring difficulties. The use of short work samples also increases most HRM problems, 
in line with findings above that they may increase turnover during probation. Personality and 
integrity tests show significant relationships only in two specifications, but coefficient signs 
are all negative, showing that they possibly work well. This is consistent with our above 
results. 
Summing up our analyses, it appears that the recent advent of social networks has not yet 
been entirely successful in filling vacancies and solving firms’ hiring problems in Germany. 
This may be because they have not yet been implemented properly. Further, our filter 
question, asking firms whether they directly target workers online from other firms, does not 
show any effects on vacancies or personnel problems. This supports our suggestion that firms 
have not successfully implemented online recruitment systems, or that it does not work well 
as a recruitment strategy in general. The most standard and long used practices, such as using 
poaching agencies and running employment interviews, seem to identify high-ability 
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personnel quite well, on the contrary. Although the use of personality tests has decreased in 
recent years, we find a positive relation between their use and match quality. There is also 
indicative evidence that personality testing reduces turnover in the long run, which is in line 
with Ones et al. (2007). Interestingly, short work samples seem to sort an adverse selection of 
lower ability workers into the establishment ultimately leading to higher turnover in the 
probationary period.  
Our most robust null-result belongs to the use of assessment centres, which have nearly zero 
correlation with worker and match quality over most specifications. This is remarkable, since 
they are implemented by a stable 11% of establishments. Although one could identify a causal 
effect of using assessment centres and other tests by running field experiments, we see our 
evidence as important from a general equilibrium perspective, as applicants are potentially 
aware of firms using certain kinds of tests and may change their application behaviour. It is 
likely that this knowledge only dissipates through the labour market over time.  
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Table 8: Recruitment practices and vacancies 
Dep. var.: Vacant positions for qualified tasks Positions to fill asap Applications per vacancy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Contemp. Lead DV LDV FE OLS Lead DV LDV FE OLS Lead DV LDV FE 
Recruiting via social networks 1.0408*** 1.3130** 0.2704 0.1672 3.4662* 5.7224 3.8013 1.4760** 2.5480 4.0809 4.0157* 3.0287 
 (0.3938) (0.6309) (0.4491) (0.2751) (1.9818) (3.7830) (2.5860) (0.7241) (2.2064) (3.3532) (2.3421) (1.8606) 
Address via social networks 3.2365*** 1.6686 0.8738 -0.0210 3.8526 -4.5060 -0.1024 1.1861 -0.1779 -3.0575 0.5914 2.5094 
 (1.2008) (1.5275) (0.5941) (0.4187) (3.7486) (6.8886) (3.6300) (1.0289) (2.7653) (5.3571) (3.3545) (3.6599) 
Poaching via EA or head-hunter 0.4163 1.1974** -0.2473 -0.8388 -1.6075 2.3097 -3.1828 -2.1880 2.9585* 1.0234 1.3520 3.7544* 
 (0.4657) (0.5015) (0.3419) (0.5611) (2.5400) (1.6261) (3.4802) (1.6072) (1.6974) (1.9650) (1.6020) (2.1599) 
Observations 3,439 1,723 1,702 3,439 3,468 1,738 1,728 3,468 3,006 1,527 1,371 3,006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.150 0.125 0.427 0.024 0.097 0.089 0.146 0 0.041 0.045 0.083 0.024 
Additional control variables: log establishment size, collective agreements (3 dummies), works council, apprenticeship training firm, establishment age, ownership type, CHRO in executive board, type 
of management, independent establishment, industry, year and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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Table 9: Recruitment practices and human resource management problems 
Dep. var.: High turnover Difficult to find qual. personnel Staff shortage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 OLS Lead DV LDV FE OLS Lead DV LDV FE OLS Lead DV LDV FE 
Recruiting via social networks 0.1944** 0.1906 0.2066** 0.2604*** 0.1418* 0.0702 0.1387 0.1733* 0.0936 0.2120* 0.1790** 0.0952 
 (0.0839) (0.1375) (0.0996) (0.1000) (0.0757) (0.1191) (0.0887) (0.0973) (0.0774) (0.1211) (0.0908) (0.0928) 
Address via social networks -0.0266 0.1463 0.0117 -0.0435 0.0596 -0.1098 -0.1055 0.0827 0.1679* 0.0822 0.0881 0.2125* 
 (0.1108) (0.1747) (0.1313) (0.1277) (0.1075) (0.1657) (0.1285) (0.1400) (0.0971) (0.1587) (0.1168) (0.1187) 
Poaching via EA or head-hunter 0.1385 0.0400 0.1573 0.1442 0.1122 0.1601 -0.0215 0.1058 0.2404*** 0.1285 0.1638* 0.2404** 
 (0.0870) (0.1275) (0.1000) (0.1011) (0.0719) (0.1147) (0.0799) (0.0918) (0.0776) (0.1160) (0.0895) (0.0938) 
Selection interview 0.0319 -0.1889 0.0839 0.0470 0.0963 -0.0339 0.0172 0.1475 0.0643 0.0610 0.0118 0.0105 
 (0.1200) (0.1605) (0.1340) (0.1416) (0.0985) (0.1478) (0.1100) (0.1259) (0.1046) (0.1462) (0.1186) (0.1233) 
Assessment centre -0.0140 0.1409 -0.0190 -0.0500 0.0580 0.0635 0.1151 -0.0401 0.0169 0.3449** 0.1437 -0.0760 
 (0.1131) (0.1830) (0.1277) (0.1339) (0.1042) (0.1627) (0.1173) (0.1309) (0.1067) (0.1637) (0.1162) (0.1283) 
Cognitive ability test 0.0877 -0.0446 0.0668 0.1135 0.1909* 0.1226 0.2283** 0.2492** 0.0019 -0.0248 0.0573 -0.0045 
 (0.1050) (0.1634) (0.1197) (0.1247) (0.0985) (0.1531) (0.1108) (0.1258) (0.0966) (0.1406) (0.1099) (0.1140) 
Personality or integrity test -0.1915* -0.1175 -0.2243* -0.2194 -0.0044 0.2127 -0.0292 -0.0047 -0.0744 0.0422 -0.1652 -0.0987 
 (0.1163) (0.1621) (0.1319) (0.1364) (0.0907) (0.1367) (0.1044) (0.1209) (0.0948) (0.1443) (0.1090) (0.1137) 
Short work sample 0.1265 0.0327 0.0779 0.1807** 0.1660*** 0.1806* 0.0763 0.2066** 0.1538** 0.2099** 0.0934 0.2179*** 
 (0.0772) (0.1153) (0.0881) (0.0883) (0.0642) (0.1005) (0.0733) (0.0834) (0.0673) (0.1005) (0.0780) (0.0808) 
Others -0.0452 -0.0564 0.0428 -0.0294 0.0181 0.2053 0.0517 0.0434 0.1449 0.4759*** 0.1593 0.1660 
 (0.1031) (0.1631) (0.1116) (0.1208) (0.0865) (0.1444) (0.0981) (0.1121) (0.0889) (0.1341) (0.1030) (0.1110) 
Average pre-hire intensity -0.0041 -0.0434** -0.0079 -0.0043 0.0118 -0.0244** 0.0025 0.0193* -0.0053 -0.0149 -0.0074 -0.0059 
 (0.0102) (0.0181) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0084) (0.0117) (0.0093) (0.0109) (0.0091) (0.0133) (0.0103) (0.0113) 
Observations 2,204 938 1,664 2,204 2,204 960 1,669 2,204 2,195 956 1,664 2,204 
Pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.119 0.145  0.072 0.075 0.145  0.137 0.157 0.170  
This table reports results of probit regressions and random-effects probit regression (columns 4, 8, 12). Additional control variables: log establishment size, collective agreements (3 dummies), works 
council, apprenticeship training firm, establishment age, ownership type, CHRO in executive board, type of management, independent establishment, industry, year and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered on establishment-level in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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7 Conclusion  
Our goal was to provide a representative overview of recruitment strategies for a large 
industrialised country. We first document across-establishment heterogeneity of hiring 
practices for a variety of establishments and industries in Germany. Second, we show that 
heterogeneity is linked to observable and unobservable establishment-level characteristics. 
Third, we measure the performance of different recruitment strategies using a variety of 
establishment-level outcomes related to hiring success.  
We find that, with some exceptions, the average use of recruitment practices has been quite 
persistent in recent years. The use of social networks to recruit has increased, and the use of 
cognitive ability and personality testing has decreased over our observations period of six 
years in the last decade. We show that differences in recruitment strategies exist between 
economic sectors, establishment size, and ownership in the cross-section. A substantial 
amount of variation in recruitment practices remains unexplained, implying that structural 
covariates do not capture all nuances of establishment-specific effects. Controlling for 
establishment fixed effects in addition to structural covariates leads to a large increase in 
explained variation of recruitment strategies, showing how prominent establishment-level 
heterogeneity (the black box) still is.  
Besides the effectiveness of poaching agencies that are rather slow at filling vacancies, a main 
takeaway of our study is that traditional screening measures such as interviews have the 
largest positive impact on the composition of worker quality. It remains to be seen, whether 
algorithms used to test an employee’s future productivity can outperform humans in testing 
for complex jobs with high match specificity. Further, our results emphasize the importance 
of personality in the recruiting process, as personality testing outperforms cognitive ability 
testing. This is in line with recent literature advocating personality as a key success factor in 
the labour market (Duckworth and Seligman, 2005, Borghans et al., 2008, Almlund et al., 
2011). One could guess that the hiring channel is mainly determined by the type of the job 
vacancy. Unfortunately, more detailed information on vacancies is not available in our data 
sets (LPP and IAB Establishment Panel), but, for instance, in the IAB Vacancy Survey. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to merge these data sets.  
Further, we show that due to persistence in some hiring strategies, representative causal 
evidence on the impact of recruitment practices on hiring success can be difficult to identify. 
Where there are substantial changes in establishment’s hiring strategies, we do find some 
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economically relevant relationships. It is important from a hiring perspective to answer the 
question whether establishments can succeed at filling vacancies not only through posting 
higher wages, but also through searching for workers and screening workers in a different 
fashion (Kaas and Kircher, 2015). Until now, there is evidence for the importance of different 
search strategies, but little causal evidence of a positive effect of screening mechanisms. 
To conclude, the recruiting behaviour of establishments still remains at least partly a black 
box. To shed more light on recruitment-related questions, researchers need to apply multiple 
complementary research methods such as formal economic models on specific mechanisms, 
laboratory and field experiments, as well as representative employee and firm surveys 
(Kampkötter and Sliwka, 2016). Our paper has collected representative evidence about the 
relevance and frequency of recruitment strategies in companies. To understand the underlying 
mechanisms at work, recent theoretical work on the demand side of the labour market and 
recruitment strategies is promising (Wolthoff, 2018; Carrillo-Tudela et al., 2020). To estimate 
causal effects of an implementation of certain practices, we can rely on a rather small, but 
growing number of field experiments on topics such as the extent of discrimination in hiring 
practices (Kaas and Manger, 2012; Becker et al., 2019; Carlsson and Eriksson, 2019) or 
information provision about job search strategies (Altmann et al., 2018). 
Future empirical research could collect more detailed information on how screening 
mechanisms are implemented and which types of employees are targeted with these 
instruments to test hypotheses at the intensive margin. It is likely that firms are not aware of 
how well their recruitment strategies work in general, and some costly practices, such as 
assessment centres, may be inefficient.  
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Figures (to be included in main text) 
Figure 1: Employer search instruments by wave (in %) 
 
Note: Average establishment frequencies (in %) calculated using representative sample weights and an 
unbalanced panel.  
 
Figure 2: Employee selection instruments by wave (in %) 
 
Note: Average establishment frequencies (in %) calculated using representative sample weights and an 
unbalanced panel.  
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Figure 3: Screening intensity by wave (average hours of screening)  
 
Note: Average hours of screening per establishment, calculated using representative sample weights 
and an unbalanced panel.  
 
Figure 4: Employee turnover during probationary period (in %) 
 
Note: Average establishment frequencies (in %) calculated using representative sample weights and an 
unbalanced panel. 
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Figure 5: Importance of recruitment criteria by wave (average of 5-point Likert scale) 
 
Note: Average of establishment 5-point Likert scale answers, calculated using representative sample 
weights and an unbalanced panel. 
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Appendix 
Table 10: Description of survey items, scales and availability across waves 
Exact wording of survey item  
Short label used 
in our analyses 
Scale (and response 
categories) 
Available 
in waves 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employer search instruments:   
Does your company use social networks to recruit staff, such as Facebook, XING or LinkedIn? 
Recruiting via 
social networks 
Yes/No/I don’t know all 
In the last two years, have you directly addressed potential applicants who were employed by another 
company via social networks such as Xing, LinkedIn, etc.? * 
Address via social 
networks 
Yes/No all 
In the last two years, have you directly recruited potential applicants who were employed by another 
company via a private employment agency or a human resource consultancy? 
Poaching via EA 
or head-hunter 
Yes/No all 
    
Pre-hire (off-the-job) screening/ employee selection instruments   
Which of the following selection instruments do you use to recruit candidates for qualified positions? 
A) Employment interview, B) Assessment Centre, C) Cognitive ability test, D) Personality or integrity 
test, E) Short work sample, F) Algorithms for determining suitable candidates ** G) Others *** 
Selection 
instruments 
Multiple answers possible 
2014, 2016, 
2018 
For the following criteria, please indicate how important they are when filling a position in your 
establishment. 
A) Professional competence, B) Personal competence, e.g. communication, presentation, self-
management skills, C) Ethical standards, e.g. integrity, social responsibility, D) General intelligence and 
cognitive ability 
Recruitment 
criteria 
Likert scale ranging from 1 
"unimportant" to 5 "very 
important" 
2016, 2018 
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On average, how many hours do you spend testing a successful candidate in employment interviews, 
tests, etc.? This refers to the average total time an applicant spends in the selection process. Please state 
this separately for positions with management responsibility and for positions without management 
responsibility. 
Screening 
intensity 
in hours (for managerial 
and non-managerial 
employees) 
all 
On-the-job screening process   
Based on all new hires in your establishment in the last two years: How high is the proportion of 
employees who voluntarily left during probationary period? And how high is the proportion of 
employees who involuntarily left during probationary period? Or have you had no employees during 
probationary period or no new hires in the last two years? 
Turnover during 
probationary 
period 
in % (voluntary and 
involuntary exits) 
all 
Notes: * From 2014 on, only establishments were asked that have stated that they use social networks for recruitment purposes. As this filter question is also available in 
2012, we have adjusted the values in 2012 accordingly so that this item is comparable across all waves. ** Response category only available in 2018. *** Not analysed here. 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Vacant positions for qualified tasks 3,564 2.619 0 11.514 0 300 
Positions to fill immediately 3,595 6.641 2 38.716 0 1,694 
Applications per vacancy 3,107 24.000 15 43.260 0 1,000 
Involuntary turnover during  
probationary period (in %) 
3,332 6.706 0 15.700 0 100 
 Average time to fill positions for qualified tasks 
less than 1 month 3,270 0.139 0 0.346 0 1 
from 1 up to under 3 months 3,270 0.597 1 0.491 0 1 
from 3 up to under 6 months 3,270 0.224 0 0.417 0 1 
6 months or more 3,270 0.040 0 0.197 0 1 
 Personnel issues expected during next two years 
High turnover 3,600 0.119 0 0.323 0 1  
Staff shortage 3,600 0.215 0 0.411 0 1  
Difficult to find qual. personnel 3,600 0.676 1 0.468 0 1  
 Recruiting measures 
Average individual fixed effect (CHK) 2,753 4.715 4.72 0.197 4 6  
Recruiting via social networks 3,562 0.366 0 0.482 0 1  
Address via social networks 3,575 0.128 0 0.334 0 1  
Poaching via EA or head-hunter 3,603 0.311 0 0.463 0 1  
 Pre-hire screening instruments 
Employment interview 2,371 0.871 1 0.335 0 1  
Assessment centre 2,371 0.131 0 0.337 0 1  
Cognitive ability test 2,371 0.146 0 0.353 0 1  
Personality or integrity test 2,371 0.152 0 0.359 0 1  
Short work sample 2,371 0.544 1 0.498 0 1  
Others 2,371 0.157 0 0.364 0 1  
Average pre-hire intensity (in hours) 3,474 4.045 3 3.619 0 32  
 Recruitment criteria  
Importance of ethical standards 1,613 3.692 4 0.911 1 5  
Importance of profess. competence 1,615 4.473 5 0.821 1 5  
Importance of personal competence 1,614 4.204 4 0.821 1 5  
Number of employees (log) 3,604 5.152 4.94 0.997 1 11  
Apprenticeship training establish. 3,605 0.735 1 0.441 0 1  
CHRO in executive board 3,581 0.460 0 0.498 0 1  
Managed by owner 3,605 0.469 0 0.499 0 1  
Independent establishment 3,593 0.745 1 0.436 0 1  
 Industrial relations 
No collective agreement 3,598 0.405 0 0.491 0 1  
Sectoral-level collective agreement 3,598 0.465 0 0.499 0 1  
Firm-level collective agreement 3,598 0.130 0 0.337 0 1  
Works council 3,599 0.637 1 0.481 0 1  
 Establishment age 
Est. age (<6 years) 3,605 0.032 0 0.176 0 1  
Est. age (6 to 10 years) 3,605 0.063 0 0.243 0 1  
Est. age (11 to 20 years) 3,605 0.174 0 0.380 0 1  
Est. age (>20 years) 3,605 0.730 1 0.444 0 1  
 Industry 
Mining, energy, water, disposal, recycl. 3,604 0.019 0 0.138 0 1  
Food, consumables 3,604 0.048 0 0.214 0 1  
Consumer goods 3,604 0.038 0 0.192 0 1  
Production goods 3,604 0.160 0 0.367 0 1  
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Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max  
Capital and durable goods 3,604 0.276 0 0.447 0 1  
Construction 3,604 0.049 0 0.215 0 1  
Wholesale, automotive 3,604 0.062 0 0.241 0 1  
Retail 3,604 0.044 0 0.205 0 1  
Transport and storage 3,604 0.055 0 0.227 0 1  
Information and communications 3,604 0.018 0 0.134 0 1  
Hospitality 3,604 0.013 0 0.113 0 1  
Financial and insurance services 3,604 0.034 0 0.180 0 1  
Economic and scientific services 3,604 0.114 0 0.318 0 1  
Education and training 3,604 0.005 0 0.071 0 1  
Health and social affairs 3,604 0.046 0 0.209 0 1  
Other services 3,604 0.015 0 0.120 0 1  
Interest groups 3,604 0.004 0 0.064 0 1  
 Year 
2012 3,605 0.338 0 0.473 0 1  
2014 3,605 0.214 0 0.410 0 1  
2016 3,605 0.235 0 0.424 0 1  
2018 3,605 0.213 0 0.410 0 1  
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Table 12: Incremental changes in pseudo (adjusted) R-squared when adding further 
controls 
 Pseudo (adj.) R2 
Total 
pseudo 
(adj.). R2 
Δ pseudo (adj.). R2  
establishment FE / 
total pseudo (adj.) R2  
 
(2) / (3) 
Dependent variables: 
All 
covariates 
 
(1) 
(1) + 
Establishment 
FE 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
(3) 
(in %) 
 
 
(4) 
Employer search  
Recruiting via social 
networks 
0.130 0.081 0.211 38.4 
Address via social 
networks 
0.168 0.121 0.289 41.9 
Poaching via EA or head-
hunter 
0.095 0.027 0.122 22.1 
Employee selection  
Employment interview 0.090 0.023 0.113 20.4 
Assessment centre 0.159 0.031 0.190 16.3 
Cognitive ability tests 0.034 0.102 0.136 75.0 
Personality & integrity 
tests 
0.034 0.128 0.162 79.0 
Short work samples 0.064 0.047 0.111 42.3 
Professional competence 0.029 0.213 0.242 88.0 
Personal competence 0.026 0.199 0.225 88.4 
Ethical values 0.037 0.299 0.336 89.0 
Cognitive skills 0.013 0.194 0.207 93.7 
Screening intensity 
managerial employees 
0.063 0.307 0.370 83.0 
Screening intensity non-
managerial employees 
0.040 0.311 0.351 88.6 
On-the-job screening 
Turnover during 
probationary period: 
voluntary 
0.038 0.281 0.319 88.1 
Turnover during 
probationary period: 
involuntary 
0.062 0.202 0.264 76.5 
 
  
50 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for outcomes as well as recruitment and hiring measures 
for panel data (decomposition of standard deviation into between and within 
components) 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
Vacant positions for qualif. 
tasks 
overall 2.618687 11.51378 0 300 N = 3,564 
between  13.15632 0 300 n = 1,773 
within  3.8636 -97.38131 102.6187 T-bar = 2.01015 
       
Positions to fill immediately 
overall 6.641168 38.71621 0 1694 N = 3,595 
between  34.25239 0 1000 n = 1,780 
within  22.69017 -406.1088 1102.891 T-bar = 2.01966 
       
Applications per vacancy 
overall 24 43.26033 0 1000 N = 3,107 
between  47.16763 0 1000 n = 1,622 
within  20.9732 -211 314 T-bar = 1.91554 
       
Involuntary turnover during 
probationary period 
overall 6.706483 15.70049 0 100 N = 3,332 
between  14.35809 0 100 n = 1,706 
within  9.440374 -43.29352 81.70648 T-bar = 1.95311 
       
Involuntary turnover due to 
misbehaviour 
overall 6.273842 18.94256 0 100 N = 1,468 
between  18.11927 0 100 n = 1,044 
within  8.750869 -43.72616 56.27384 T-bar = 1.40613 
       
Involuntary turnover due to 
lacking suitability 
overall 39.1233 45.61418 0 100 N = 1,468 
between  42.29306 0 100 n = 1,044 
within  19.66356 -10.8767 89.1233 T-bar = 1.40613 
       
Expected issue: High 
turnover 
overall 0.1186111 0.3233753 0 1 N = 3,600 
between  0.2837958 0 1 n = 1,779 
within  0.2021007 -0.6313889 0.8686111 T-bar = 2.02361 
       
Expected issue: Staff 
shortage 
overall 0.2147222 0.4106865 0 1 N = 3,600 
between  0.3573864 0 1 n = 1,779 
within  0.2541678 -0.5352778 0.9647222 T-bar = 2.02361 
       
Expected issue: Difficulty of 
finding qual. personnel 
overall 0.6761111 0.4680232 0 1 N = 3,600 
between  0.4060185 0 1 n = 1,779 
within  0.2800852 -0.0738889 1.426111 T-bar = 2.02361 
       
Individual wage fixed 
effects (CHK) 
overall 4.714581 0.197098 3.90155 5.65265 N = 2,753 
between  0.1981429 4.125272 5.641122 n = 1,490 
within  0.0257604 4.395166 5.345781 T-bar = 1.84765 
       
Recruit via social networks 
overall 0.365525 0.4816447 0 1 N = 3,562 
between  0.4354085 0 1 n = 1,769 
within  0.261092 -0.384475 1.115525 T-bar = 2.01357 
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Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Address via social networks 
overall 0.1278322 0.3339495 0 1 N = 3,575 
between  0.2988271 0 1 n = 1,776 
within  0.1894312 -0.6221678 0.8778322 T-bar = 2.01295 
       
Poach via EA or head-hunter 
overall 0.3114072 0.4631331 0 1 N = 3,603 
between  0.4176348 0 1 n = 1,783 
within  0.2491889 -0.4385928 1.061407 T-bar = 2.02075 
       
Selection interview 
overall 0.8713623 0.3348691 0 1 N = 2,371 
between  0.2930066 0 1 n = 1,361 
within  0.1837261 0.2046956 1.538029 T-bar = 1.7421 
       
Assessment centre 
overall 0.1307465 0.337194 0 1 N = 2,371 
between  0.3153039 0 1 n = 1,361 
within  0.1532581 -0.5359201 0.7974132 T-bar = 1.7421 
       
Cognitive ability test 
overall 0.1455082 0.3526869 0 1 N = 2,371 
between  0.3109296 0 1 n = 1,361 
within  0.1945097 -0.5211584 0.8121749 T-bar = 1.7421 
       
Personality or integrity test 
overall 0.1518347 0.3589363 0 1 N = 2,371 
between  0.3264979 0 1 n = 1,361 
within  0.1904913 -0.514832 0.8185013 T-bar = 1.7421 
       
Short work sample 
overall 0.5440742 0.4981587 0 1 N = 2,371 
between  0.4496285 0 1 n = 1,361 
within  0.258743 -0.1225924 1.210741 T-bar = 1.7421 
       
Other selection measures 
overall 0.1568958 0.3637792 0 1 N = 2,371 
between  0.3199934 0 1 n = 1,361 
within  0.2089758 -0.5097708 0.8235625 T-bar = 1.7421 
       
Pre-hire intensity (amount of 
time for screening) 
overall 4.044934 3.618881 0 32 N = 3,474 
between  3.100331 0 24 n = 1,741 
within  2.136113 -11.58007 19.66993 T-bar = 1.9954 
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Figure 6: Motives for the use of social networks as recruitment tool 
 
Note: Establishment shares (in %) calculated using representative sample weights and unbalanced 
panel. Source: Linked Personnel Panel waves 2014-2018.  
 
Figure 7: Reasons for involuntary turnover during probationary period (in %) 
 
Note: Establishment shares (in %) calculated using representative sample weights and unbalanced 
panel. Source: Linked Personnel Panel waves 2016-2018.  
 
